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Misleading Advertising and the Defence of Due 
Diligence
The concept of absolute liability in relation to public welfare offences 
was created by the mid-nineteenth century British judiciary “as a means 
of doing away with mens rea for petty police offences”1. Its survival in 
the twentieth century can be attributed to the numerous contemporary 
public welfare statutes that have been passed to protect the complex and 
myriad interests of modern society. Prior to the last major revision of 
the Combines Investigation Act,2 the fact that liability for misleading adver­
tising offences was imposed without recourse to a defence reflected the 
widely held view that the interests of the public were better served by 
the expedient disposition of such cases. However, the plight o f the 
faultless offender, balanced against the interests of the public, has, more 
than any other factor, caused the erosion of the concept of absolute 
liability and the recent shift to strict liability both by legislation and by 
the courts. When the Combines Investigation Act was amended in 1976, the 
legislators acknowledged the current trend away from absolute liability 
and included a statutory due diligence defence limited in application to 
two of the expanded list of provisions dealing with deceptive advertising 
and marketing practices. In light o f  subsequent events, the partial conces­
sion to an express due diligence defence raised issues under the Combines 
Investigation Act that had not been contemplated when the statutory 
defence came into force.
Section 37.3(2) o f the Act provides a defence to persons charged 
under section 36 or 36.1 who can prove:
(a) that the act or omission giving rise to the offence with which he 
is charged was the result of error;
(b) that he took reasonable precautions and exercised due diligence 
to prevent the occurrence o f such error;
(c) that he, or another person, took reasonable measures to bring 
the erro r to the attention o f the class o f persons likely to have 
been reached by the representation or testimonial; and
(d) the measures referred to in paragraph (c) . . . were taken forth­
with after the representation was made or the testimonial was 
published.
'R. v. The City of Sault Ste. Mane, 40 C.C.C. (2d) 353, at page 363.
JR.S.C. 1970, c. C-23; as amended S.C. 1974-75-76, c.76.
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Sections 36 and 36.1 have been generally identified as the misleading 
advertising provisions under the Act since the essence o f the offences 
contained therein lies in the making o f representations to the public. 
The remaining provisions prohibit specific marketing practices wherein 
the deception Ties in the practice itself. Although these provisions are not 
amenable to section 37.3(2), limited defences have been provided in 
respect o f section 37, the bait and switch selling provision and section 
37.1, the prohibition against selling above advertised prices. The pyramid 
and referral selling provisions provide an exemption in respect of schemes 
that have been authorized by provincial legislation.
In 1978, the Supreme Court of Canada decision of R. v. The City of 
Sault Ste. M arie,3 while acknowledging the necessity o f retaining the 
concept of absolute liability for some legislative purposes, nevertheless 
gave judicial recognition to a category of strict liability offences that 
would henceforth be amenable to a common law due diligence defence. 
Dickson J., in giving the judgm ent of the Court, described the category 
of strict liability offences as follows:
Offences in which there is no necessity for the prosecution to prove the 
existence of mens rea; the doing of the prohibited act prima facie imports the 
offence, leaving it open to the accused to avoid liability by proving that he 
took all reasonable care. This involves consideration of what a reasonable man 
would have done in the circumstances. The defence will be available if the 
accused reasonably believed in a mistaken set of facts which, if true, would 
render the act or omission innocent, or if he took all reasonable steps to avoid 
the particular event.4
In distinguishing between offences of strict liability and offences of 
absolute liability “where it is not open to the accused to exculpate himself 
by showing that he was free of fault,”5 Dickson J. tilted the balance in 
favour of strict liability offences by holding that public welfare offences 
would prima facie  fall within the category o f strict liability. Absolute 
liability offences “would be those in respect o f which the legislature had 
made it clear that the guilt would follow proof merely of the proscribd 
act”8. In determining whether a particulr offence fell into the absolute 
liability category, Dickson J. further elucidated that the primary consid­
erations would be “the overall regulatory pattern adopted by the Legis­
lature, the subject-matter of the legislation, the importance o f the penalty, 
and the precision of the language used”7. The Supreme Court of Canada 
reiterated its position in the following year in R. v. Chapin8 and further 
limited the category of absolute liability offences by emphasizing that the





'(1979), 45 C.C.C. (2d) 333.
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severity of the penalty imposed is a major consideration in determining 
into which of the two categories an offence may fall.
In the wake of Sault Ste. Marie and Chapin, the following issues were 
foreseen with respect to the misleading advertising and deceptive mar­
keting practices provisions of the Combines Investigation Act:
(1) Whether the common law defence was available to persons charged 
under 36 and 36.1 for which a statutory due diligence defence, 
more restricted in scope, had already been provided.
(2) W hether the common law defence was available in respect of 
sections 37 and 37.1 for which specific defences had been pro­
vided.
(3) W hether the remaining provisions fall within the category of 
prima facie strict liability offences as defined in Sault Ste. Marie, 
and are therefore amenable to the common law defence.
The first issue was conclusively settled by the Ontario Court of 
Appeal in R. v. Consumers Distributing Company Limited,,9 a case which 
involved a false representation, in the form of point-of-purchase signs, 
respecting the fuel savings caused by a fuel saving device. It was estab­
lished as fact that the company had not complied with the requirements 
of paragraphs 37.3(2)(c) and (d). Consumers Distributing raised in its 
defence the fact that it had honestly believed in the accuracy of the 
representation and that such belief was based on its consideration of the 
independent test results and the testimonials of reliable users provided 
by the supplier of the device. The Court indicated that the common law 
test as enunciated in Sault Ste. Marie was met by the company in that its 
consideration of the materials, provided by a reputable supplier, consti­
tuted the taking o f reasonable steps to ensure the accuracy of the 
representation. However, the Court concluded that Parliament, by pro­
viding a defence to a charge under paragraph 36(1 )(a) several years 
before the common law defence was established by the Supreme Court 
of Canada, intended that it should be the only defence available to the 
charge. Therefore, since the accused had failed to take the immediate 
corrective measures o f advising persons o f the error contained in its 
advertisement, it was unable to rely on section 37.3(2).
The second foreseeable issue was considered by an Ontario County 
Court on appeal from a provincial court decision. In R. v. International 
Vacations L td .,10 section 36(1 )(a) and section 37, the bait and switch 
provision, were subjected to an analysis by the Court under the Sault Ste.
‘•U nreported, February 28, 1980, Ont. Co. Ct., reversed on another ground by (1981), 59 C.C.C. (2d)
557 (Ont. C.A.)’.
•(1980), 57 C.C.C. (2d) 317.
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Marie doctrine. Section 37 makes it an offence for a person to advertise 
at a bargain price a product that he does not supply in reasonable 
quantities having regard to the nature o f the market in which he carries 
on business, the nature and size of the business carried on by him and 
the nature o f the advertisement. There are three specfic defences avail­
able in respect of this offence. The Court, in determining that section 
36(1 )(a) and section 37 fell within the category of strict liability offences, 
followed the reasoning of Chapin and concluded that the severity of the 
penalties imposed under the sections precluded them from being absolute 
liability offences. With reference to the particular defence available to 
the accused, the court held:
As a result, absent an express legislative defence, if an accused under these 
sections established on a balance of probabilities the defence of reasonable 
care as elucidated in Sault Ste. Marie, he would be entitled to acquittal. 
Parliament, however, by enacting the express defences that are contained in 
subsection 37.3(2) with respect to the section 36(1) offence and in subsection 
37(3) with respect to the 37(2) offence, excluded by necessary implication the 
reasonableness or due diligence defences that would otherwise have availed 
the accused at common law."
Despite the decision of R. v. International Vacations Limited, the influ­
ence exerted by the Sault Ste. Marie doctrine can be seen at work in 
subsequent cases wherein section 37.1 was at issue. Section 37.1 prohibits 
the supplying of products at prices higher than advertised! By virtue of 
subsection 37.1(3), the offence does not apply with respect to an adver­
tisement in a catalogue if the catalogue states that prices are subject to 
error and if the person establishes that the price was in error; with 
respect to an advertisement that is immediately followed by a correction; 
or with respect to the sale o f a security obtained during the existence of 
a current prospectus. What these express defences do not contemplate 
is the common situation where the advertised price is correct, but higher 
prices are charged due to the lack of an efficient system of ensuring that 
shelf prices conform with advertised prices, and that check-out cashiers 
charge the appropriate prices. In 1981, three superm arkets12 in British 
Columbia were tried separately in the provincial courts for having supplied 
products at higher than advertised prices. In all three cases, the stores 
demonstrated that management had effected a system whereby advertised 
specials could be easily identified by the cashiers; and in all three cases, 
the Sault Ste. Marie defence was successfully raised. In each case, the 
court applied the common law defence without initially determining 
w hether in fact it was applicable, having regard to the existence o f specific 
statutory defences. Although R. v. Commercial Supermarket (1971) Ltd. was 
subsequently appealed,13 the decision of the trial judge was upheld by the
"Ibid.
ltR. v. McLellan's Supermarket Ltd., Unreported, December 12, 1981, R. v. Commercial Supermarket (1971) 
Ltd., Unreported, January 13, 1981, B.C. Prov. Ct. R. v. Lockhart Foods Ltd., Unreported, January 20, 
1981, B.C. Prov. Ct.
' ’Unreported, October 7, 1981, B.C. Co. Ct.
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County Court without reference to International Vacations Limited. The 
lack of proper analysis o f a central issue renders the foregoing cases 
vulnerable to future reconsideration by the Courts. However, the super­
market cases do reflect the general shift in judicial attitude in favour of 
the faultless offender.
There remains the issue of whether the common law defence is 
applicable with respect to the remaining offences for which no statutory 
defences have been expressly provided. Although this aspect was not 
specifically addressed in either Consumers Distributing or International Va­
cations, the courts in each case indicated that, but for the presence of the 
statutory defences, the due diligence defence as enunciated in Sault Ste. 
Marie would apply.
Whatever the original intent of Parliament in expressly providing 
limited defences with respect to only some of the misleading advertising 
and deceptive marketing practices provisions, subsequent events indicate 
that the gaps are being gradually filled in by the courts. The result o f 
the combined efforts o f the legislators and the judiciary is that while 
some persons charged under the provisions may be able to avail them ­
selves o f the much broader common law defence, others will be limited 
to the defences imposed by statute.
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